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INTRODUCTION
Defendants raise several issues in their Brief on Appeal that
must be addressed in this Reply Brief.

However, because the trail

court's grants of Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment resolved
multiple claims and issues, none of the issues that will be dealt
with hererin are entirely dispostive of the case.

Taken together,

however, the Defendants raise three primary arguments and then cite
the trial court and other authority in support of their allegations
that Plaintiffs have failed, as a matter of law, to make and prove
the factual allegations necessary to prevail upon their nine separate
causes of action.
This reply brief will address the issues raised by Defendants1
Brief on Appeal as they are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
One of the principal issues raised by the Defendants is the
issue of whether Plaintiffs' Affidavits contradict their deposition
testimony, or contain inadmissible hearsay. This issue is not
properly before the Court on appeal, given that the trial court
refused to rule on Defendants' Motion. Furthermore, Plaintiffs'
Affidavits and Verified Complaint are the only significant
evidentiary testimony in the record with regard to the second Motion
for Summary Judgment, given that Plaintiffs depositions have never
been entered into the record before the trial court.

Finally, it is

uncontestable that the trial court reviewed these affidavits, since
they are cited directly in the trial court's Memorandum Decision.

1

The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Jeanette
Lynton could not be found personally liable for the actions of people
who were allegedly her agents-

The question of precisely which legal

entity—the Nevada corporation, or Jeanette Lynton as an individual—
was operating the Orem plant between August 1992 and January 5, 1993
was a question of materially disputed fact, not of law.

It was

therefore inappropriate for the trial court to decide this issue in
favor of Defendant Lynton at Summary Judgment.
The trial court also erred in ruling as a matter of law that
Plaintiffs had to prove actual damages in order to establish their
prima facie claims.

The trial court applied the damage rule

appropriate to negligence actions, rather than the rule applicable to
actions for damages based on intentional torts.

Eight of plaintiffs'

nine causes of action fall into the category of dignitary, or
intentional, torts. As a matter of law, nominal damages are
available for technical violations of these torts, and in most cases
emotional damages are presumed, regardless of whether or not there is
expert testimony to support them.
Finally, the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that, for one reason or another, plaintiffs had failed to allege or
prove one or more necessary elements of each of their nine causes of
action.
Because the trial court erred on so many different issues, the
cumulative effect of these errors was a gross miscarriage of justice,
when the trial court granted both of the Defendants' Motions for

2

Summary Judgment.

Therefore, the trial courts' orders should be

reversed, and this case should be remanded for trial on the merits.
ARGUMENT
Defendants1 Allegations of Plaintiffs Hearsay and Conflicting
Testimony are not ripe for determination.
Throughout their Brief on Appeal, Defendants attempt to
discredit the testimony Plaintiffs offered in their Affidavits
attached to their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendants1 refer in their "Statement

of Facts" to the alleged hearsay evidence contained in these
affidavits.

This issue, and Defendants' additional arguments

regarding the alleged conflicts between Plaintiffs1 affidavit
testimony and their deposition testimony are not properly before this
Court, and cannot be decided.

This is the case because these issues

were, as the Defendants1 point out, raised in their Motion to Strike
and/or to Disregard Portions of the Affidavits.

Plaintiffs responded

in substantial and complete detail to Defendants1 Motion. However,
the Trial Court expressly declined to rule on this Motion in its
Memorandum Decision:
Because the Court has found no genuine issue of material
fact exists and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law, the Court need not address defendants1 Motion to
Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs1 Affidavits.1
Because the Trial Court did not rule in this Motion, these issues are
not ripe for review or determination by this Court.2

1

Furthermore,

Record, p. 685.

2

Should this Court wish to review these issues anyway,
the Plaintiffs will quite willingly rest their case on their
Memorandum in Objection to Defendants' Motion to Strike, Record
3

because the Trial Court refused to rule on this Motion to Strike, and
because the Trail Court cites to the disputed affidavits in its
Memorandum Decision, it must be presumed, on appeal, that the
contents of the affidavits were properly part of the record
considered in determining whether to grant Defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment.
It appears that Defendants would prefer to substitute the
Plaintiffs1 deposition testimony.

However, it is clear from the

record that this testimony was not before the trial court when it
determined these motions for summary judgment. Although both parties
cite various portions of the depositions in their Memorandum, the
fact of the matter is that with one minor exception,3 none of the
deposition testimony had been entered in evidence before the trial
court, and indeed the deposition transcript was the subject of some
controversy.4

The Utah Supreme Court faced a similar situation in the

case of Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., In that case, the Court
stated:

pp 636-680. It is the Plaintiffs' position that the
Defendants' contentions are quite competently answered and
disposed of in that Objection.
3

Plaintiffs attached copies of eleven pages of their
deposition testimony to their Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Jeanette Lynton's Motion for Summary Judgment. These
pages are the only parts of the depositions that have been
entered into evidence.
4

See, e.g., Plaintiffs' "Statement of Attorney Regarding
Corrections to Plaintiffs' Depositions," Record, pp. 177-164;
Defendants' "Motion to Supress Depositions," Record p. 221;
Defendants' "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supress
Depositions," Record, pp. 226-222; Plaintiffs' "Objection to
Use of English Transcript," pp. 297-294.
4

We consider only the pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers
to interrogatories, and affidavits properly before the trial
court judge. Papers not properly filed with the trial court
will not be considered. Depositions that were never introduced
into evidence nor read by the trial judge will not be considered
on appeal.5
As in that case, the deposition testimony in the present matter has
never been entered into evidence.

The only applicable record

testimony before the trial court was the Plaintiffs1 original
verified complaint,6 an affidavit of Defendant Jeanette Lynton,7 an
affidavit of Brian Lancaster,8 defendants1 "Answer to Plaintiffs1
First set of Interrogatories,"9 and the affidavits plaintiffs
submitted in support of their Objection to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.10

This testimony, actually in the record, is the

only evidence that can be considered by this court in reviewing this
matter on appeal.
The Issue of precisely what entity was doing business in Orem
between August 1992 and January 1993—whether it was Jeanette
Lynton, acting as an individual, or the Nevada corporation DOT
Adventures—is a material disputed issue of fact, not a question
of law.
The facts on the record before the trial court when Defendant
Lyntonfs Motion for Summary Judgment was decided were simple:

5

Pratt by and through Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co.,
813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991).
6

Record, pp. 9-1.

7

Record, pp. 135-128.

8

Record, pp. 85-79.

9

Record, pp. 286-251.

10

Record, pp. 457-419.

1) Defendant Lynton was an officer of the Nevada corporation DOT
Adventures, incorporated in 1989, and in good standing through
1993.ai
2) Defendant Lynton, as an individual, was the registered owner
in Utah of the trademark D.O.T.S., Dozens of Terrific Stamps.
This trademark was originally registered in the state of Utah in
1989, and this registration was renewed in January 1992.12
3) In August and December 1992 a business entity hired employees
and began manufacturing rubber stamps with novelty designs in
Orem, Utah.13
4) The rubber stamps were sold under the trademark owned
personally by Defendant Lynton—D.O.T.S., Dozens of Terrific
Stamps.14
5) The employees of the business entity were paid with checks on
a purported corporate account. The corporate name on the checks
was DOT Adventures, Inc., with the address of the Orem
production facility.15
6) During the period of time from August 1992 to January 1,
1993, there was no corporate entity with this name on record
with the Utah State Division of Corporations.16

11

Record, pp. 240-229,

12

Record, pp. 58-56.

13

Record, pp. 9-10.

14

Record, pp. 59-55.

15

Record, pp. 132-128,

16

Record, pp. 62-55.

7) On January 5, 1993, the Nevada corporation, DOT Adventures,
registered as a foreign corporation doing business in Utah under
the name DOT Adventures, Inc.17
8) On March 18, 1993, ownership of the D.O.T.S., Dozens of
Terrific Stamps trademark/dba was transferred to the Nevada
Corporation, DOT Adventures.18
It is a disputed issue of material fact whether the entity
manufacturing and selling stamps in Utah between August and January
5, 1993 was the individual Jeanette Lynton, the owner of the
trademark name underwhich the Orem stamps were marketed and sold, or
Jeanette Lynton acting in her capacity as a corporate officer of the
Nevada corporation DOT Adventures.

In ruling as a matter of law that

the entity was the Nevada corporation, DOT Adventures, the trial
court inappropriately confused issues of fact with issues of law.
It is a logical fallacy to argue as Defendant Lynton has argued19
that because the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures was in good
standing in Nevada during the entire period in question, and because
the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures registered in January 1993 as a
foreign corporation doing business in Utah under the name DOT
Adventures, Inc., that, ipso

facto,

the entity doing business in Utah

prior to January 1993 was also the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures.
Plaintiffs are not, despite Defendants' arguments to the
contrary, here arguing that the Nevada Corporation DOT Adventures has
no standing to defend this case.

Quite the contrary.

As soon as

Plaintiffs were notified of the existence of the Nevada corporation,
and its alleged role in this matter, the Plaintiffs moved to amend
17

Record, p. 55.

18

Record, p. 56.

19

Appellee's Brief on Appeal, pp. 9-10, and 17.

their complaint to add the Nevada corporation as an alternative
defendant.
But it is the Plaintiffs' position that the mere fact that the
Nevada corporation DOT Adventures registered in January 1993 as a
foreign corporation doing business in Utah under the name DOT
Adventures, Inc. cannot establish as a matter of law or fact that
this same Nevada corporation was the entity doing business in Utah
under that name prior to registration—despite the similarity in the
names being used.
The registration required by law does unquestionably establish
the prima facie case that all actions taken in Utah in the name of
DOT Adventures Inc. after January 5, 1993, were taken by the Nevada
corporation DOT Adventures.

But as a matter of law, that

registration says absolutely nothing about actions prior to
registration.

Because there was no business entity legally

registered in Utah between August 1992 and January 5, 1993, the
question of who, precisely, was operating the Orem factory is an
issue of fact, not of law.

The stamps were being sold during this

time under a trademark that was registered as the personal property
of Defendant Jeanette Lynton.

There was testimony in the record that

Defendant Esquivel represented Ms. Lynton to be the owner of the
business.20

The only link on the record between the Nevada

corporation DOT Adventures and the entity issuing paychecks between
August and January is the similarity in the names, the January 1993
legal registration that linked the two names, and the Affidavits of

20

8

Record, pp. 193-179.

Ms. Lynton and her accountant.21

The mere similarity of names does

not establish as a matter of law that the business entities were
identical, nor does the after-the-fact registration linking the two
names.

The credibility of Ms. Lynton's affidavit is questionable

in

this matter, and the affidavit testimony of Mr. Lancaster is
inconclusive on this issue. Mr. Lancaster testifies clearly that the
company records indicate that the Plaintiffs were employees of DOT
Adventures, Inc.

Plaintiffs are not disputing that this was the name

on their paychecks. Mr. Lancaster further states that company
records indicate that DOT Adventures, Inc. is a Nevada Corporation,
doing business in Utah. Again, Plaintiffs do not dispute that this
is what the official records indicate now.

However, Mr. Lancaster's

affidavit does not clarify whether corporate records between August
1992 and January 5, 1993 also indicate that the Utah entity was a
Nevada corporation.
Plaintiffs asked, in their First Set of Interrogatories and
Request for Production, for copies of "all business and/or management
meeting minutes for the period of time between March 1992 and March
1993."22

Defendants objected to this production request, and failed

to provide any responsive documents.23 At oral argument on Defendant
Lynton's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs requested either
that Lynton's Motion be denied, or that, in the alternative,
plaintiffs be allowed a continuance under Utah Rule of Civil

Record, pp. 135-133/ 85-83.
Record, p. 287.
Record, p. 272.

Procedure 56 (f), in order to pursue further discovery relating to
this issue.24

Relevant evidence that might be dispositive of this

issue would be proof as to which entity—Lynton as an individual, or
the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures, paid sales and income tax on
the profits of the business between the months of August 1992 and
January 5, 1993.
This factual issue is material.

It bears directly on the

question of who was employing Defendant Esquivel, and therefore who
was ultimately responsible for his tortious actions.

This issue of

fact is disputed, and the evidence in the record is not conclusive as
a matter of law.

Therefore, the trial courtfs Order dismissing

Jeanette Lynton as an individual defendant was in error, and should
be reversed.
The Trial Court's insistance that Plaintiffs provide proof of
actual damages, allegedly as part of their prima facie case,
necessary to prevail against Defendants1 Motion for Summary
Judgment, was wrong as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and Amended Complaint set forth
allegations of nine separate causes of action.

Some are particular

to one or another of the Plaintiffs individually, some apply to all
four.

The causes of action are for Wrongful Detainer, Assault,

Battery, False Imprisonment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and three
counts of invasion of privacy in the form of intrusion into
Plaintiffs1 private property and personal affairs.25 Eight of these

10

24

Record, p. 745.

25

Record, pp. 9-1; 107-99.

causes of action fall into a category of tort known as the dignatary
tort.26

Professor Dan Dobbs, in his three volume treatise The Law of

Remedies devotes an entire chapter to this special class of tort.
After defining what torts are classified as dignitary, he states the
following:
All these dignatery harms may cause economic harm as well
as affront to personality. If so, economic damages may be

recovered. However, in a great many of the cases, the only harm
is the affront to the plaintiff's
dignity as a human being,
the
damage to his self-image,
and the resulting
mental distress.
It
does not follow that recovery is limited to nominal damages,
however, even if the extent of the emotional distress
is not
proved.
On the contrary,
the traditional
rule for
"trespassory"
cases like assaults and batteries,
was that "general damages" or
"presumed damages" of a substantial
amount can be recovered
merely upon showing that the tort was committed at all.21
The undisputed facts of this case are that28:
1) Plaintiff employees were detained for more than one hour in
the cafeteria area of their place of employment—an area a
substantial distance from the nearest door, such that Plaintiffs
could not know if that door was locked or not.29
2) Defendant Esquivel, the factory manager, in whom rested
complete authority to hire and fire the factory employees,
stated that, while he knew what he was doing was illegal, he did
not care, and that all factory employees were going to have to
submit to a search, one by one, in the bathrooms.30

26

See, e.g., Dobbs: The Law of Remedies, 2nd ed., Dan
B. Dobbs (1993 West Publishing Company), Vol. 2, §7.1 (1), p.
259. The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
does not fall into this category.
27

Ld./ italics added.

28

The record evidence in support of these facts is
found in the Affidavits of plaintiffs and their relatives. The
Spanish originals of these Affidavits are found in the Record
at pp. 397-34 6. However, all citations are to the Amended
Translations, properly attested to by the translators, and
found in the Record at pp. 454-420.
29

Record, pp. 452, 447.

30

Record, pp. 439-438, 452.

11

3) Defendant Esquivel stated that if anyone wanted to object,
they could, but that then everyone would know who the thief
was.31
4) Plaintiff employees were required one by one to enter the
male or female bathroom respectively, with their supervisor, and
submit to a search of their persons and personal property.32
5) There was no rational basis for the search—there was no
claim that the allegedly stolen $20.00 bill was uniquely
identifiable, therefore even had a $20.00 bill been found in the
search, there would have been no way to prove it was the one
stolen.33
6) Plaintiffs' personal property, including their wallets and
lunch bags, were opened and searched.34
7) Plaintiff Mazariegos was forced to pull her blouse out of
her pants, undo her bra, and submit to her superisor placing her
hands under the blouse and running her hands up around her
midriff under the bra line. She was further required to take
off her shoes and socks and roll up her pant legs. Finally, the
supervisor took a pencil and picked through Ms. Mazariegos1 hair
in a manner reminiscent of someone looking for lice.35
These facts, despite Defendants1 claims to the contrary, state a
prima facie case for wrongful detention; false imprisonment; assault;
battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of
privacy by intrusion upon seclusion.

Plaintiffs were first

threatened with an unlawful search.

They were then required,

implicitly, to chose between losing their employment or sitting idly
by for more than one hour, instead of attending to the work which the
Plaintiffs had hired on to do, and then one by one entering and
remaining in a bathroom while their supervisors rifled through their
wallets, pockets, purses, lunch sacks, or physically searched thier
person—all in an illegal and completely pointless search for an
31

Record, pp. 447, 439-438.

32

Record, pp. 454-438.

33

Record, p. 451.

34

Id.
Record, pp. 449-446.

12

unidentifiable twenty dollar bill.

This entire situation was

offensive to the dignity and personal integrity of the individuals
involved.

The Plaintiffs, and others who submitted to the search,

felt they had no choice but to submit to this humilliation, because
of the economic power Defendant Esquivel wielded in their lives. And
yet the trial court found in part that because damages had not been
proven, summary judgment was appropriate on all causes of action.
Defendants' brief cites the discussion between Plaintiffs'
counsel and the trial court during oral argument on this matter.
What the Defendants fail to recognize, however, is that Plaintiffs'
contention, both to the trial court and to this court on appeal, is
that the trial court was in error in requiring plaintiffs to prove
actual damages in order to prevail against the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

It seems apparent upon review both of this

discussion at oral argument and of the trial court's final decision
on this matter, that the trial court failed to make the distinction
between the intentional torts here at issue, and other torts
involving negligence.

Negligence torts do require proof of damages

for a plaintiff to prevail.

Intentional torts do not.

This

distinction is clearly made in Dobbs, The Law of Remedies:
The common law dignitary torts—a technical assault without
physical harm, for example—are comparable to libel and slander
in that they have traditionally supported damages for intangible
injuries even when little or no economic or physical harm is
done. The tort is said to damage in itself, or as more commonly
put, the plaintiff can recover "general" or "presumed" damages
in substantial or more-than-nominal amounts.
This rule is quite different from the rule applied to many
other torts, such as ordinary negligence torts, in which no

13

damages may be recovered unless physical or economic harm is
first shown.36
One of the primary basis on which the trial court granted Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgment was a substantial discussion of damages.
The trial court begins with the following statement of the incorrect
legal rule:
It is well known that, in a civil suit, damages may not be
recovered unless the plaintiff can prove the existence of
damages resulting to the plaintiff as a result of a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant
Damages recoverable for a
tort are limited to those damages directly attributable to the
tort.37
After this introductory paragraph, the trial court goes on to discuss
the Plaintiffs1 failure to show any economic damages.

The trial

court then refuses to consider the psychological evidence that the
court had itself requested, on the grounds that Dr. Mejia's expert
report was not sworn in proper affidavit form, and was therefore
inadmissible.

The trial court concludes:

Lacking any evidence that plaintiffs have incurred any
monetary or psychological damage resulting from the search
conducted by defendants, the Court finds that plaintiffs have no
cause of action against defendants. Accordingly, defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.38
This statement is a completely inaccurate statement of the law, and
as such provides no basis for the trial court's grant of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

This statement is also a completely

inaccurate statement of the facts of the case, but this issue will be
addressed in the final section of this brief.

Because the trial

Dobbs, supra, § 7.3(2), at pp. 304-305.
Record, p. 687 [quotation and citation omitted].
Record, p. 686-685.

court so completely misunderstood the proper legal damage rules
applicable to this case, the trial court's grant of Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgment was inappropriate and should be reversed,
and this matter remanded for trial on the merits.
The Trial Court Erred in Holding, As a Matter of Law, that
Plaintiffs1 Allegations and Testimony Failed to Establish
the Necessary Prima Facie Case for Each of their Causes of
Action.
Defendants remaining arguments in their Brief on Appeal are
essentially limited to their attempts to support the trial court's
holding that Summary Judgment was appropriate because plaintiffs
failed to establish a prima facie case for each of their causes of
action.
Wrongful Detention
In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court held, as a matter of
law, that Plaintiffs1 cause of action for wrongful detention failed
because "plaintiffs have not proven that defendants substantially
interfered with plaintiffs1 liberty.

Plaintiffs knew the location of

an exit and made no attempt to leave."39 (Defendants, in their brief
on appeal, contend that a criminal statute does not create a cause of
action in tort.

However, this contention is also not properly before

this Court, as the Trial Court considered this issue, but refused to
rule on it.40)
Contrary to the Trial Court's apparent understanding, the tort
of wrongful detention, as defined in the Utah Code Annotated, §7 6-5-

39

Record, p. 689.

40

See, Record, pp. 689-692.

304, does not require that the Plaintiff attempt to leave. Rather,
it requires a knowing, unlawful, restraint of another, so as to
interfere substantially with his liberty.

Esquivel stated that the

search was illegal, but that he was going to require each employee to
submit, regardless of the illegality.41

Esquivel further required the

employees to remain for more than one hour in the cafeteria area,
while they proceeded one by one to the bathrooms to be searched.42
The employees were effectively restrained from continuing in the
normal productive activities for which they had been employed.

They

were further restrained from leaving entirely by the barely implicit
threat of losing their jobs, should they not submit.43
In determining whether to grant or deny a Motion for Summary
Judgment, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.44

In the present case, it

is reasonable to infer from the undisputed facts that Defendant
Esquivelfs actions substantially interfered with the Plaintiffs1
liberty to continue their daily productive routine in their work
place.

Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of this cause of

action should be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits.
Assault and Battery
In dismissing Plaintiffs1 causes of action for assault and
battery, the trial court stated that "The Court finds no evidence

16

41

Record, pp. 452, 439-438.

42

Record, pp. 454-438.

43

Id.

44

Pratt, supra.

that defendant Esquivel intended the search of the plaintiffs to
cause harmful or offensive contact, or to cause plaintiffs to be in
imminent apprehension of such contact."45

Defendants argue in support

of the trial courts' decision that these causes of action must fail
because there is no allegation that Defendant Esquivel intended to
cause the Plaintiffs any physical harm, nor did any of the Defendants
offer any threats of bodily harm or violence.

However, both the

trial court and the defendants again completely misstate and
misunderstand the legal principles involved.

One hornbook explains

the legal rule this way:
To constitute a battery, [or assault, since the required
intent is the same] the actor must have intended to bring about
a harmful or offensive contact or to put the other party in
apprehension thereof. A result is intended if the act is done
for the purpose of accomplishing the result or with
knowledge

that

to a substantial

certainty

such a result

will

ensue.46

Plaintiffs have testified that the forced, illegal, search of their
persons and personal property was offensive.
stated that he knew the search was illegal.

Defendant Esquivel
From those two

undisputed facts, it is reasonable to infer that Esquivel also knew
that this type of search was illegal precisely because people found
them offensive; therefore, it is also reasonable to infer that
Esquivel knew that requiring forty of his employees to submit to such
a search would offend them.

These reasonable inferences from the

undisputed facts are sufficient to support the Plaintiffs1

45

Record, p. 689-688.

46

The Law of Torts, 2nd ed. Fowler V. Harper, Fleming
James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray (Little, Brown & Co., Boston)
1986. § 3.3 pp. 272-273 [italics added].
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allegations that Defendant Esquivel intended to cause offensive
contact to the Plaintiffs and the other employees when he required
them to submit to a search of their persons and property.

Because

the reasonable inferences, drawn in Plaintiffs1 favor, are sufficient
to indicate the strong probability, if not certainty, that Defendant
Esquivel intended to cause offensive contact to his employees when he
ordered them to submit to a physical search of their persons and
property, the trial court erred in dismissing these two causes of
action.

The trial courts1 order, therefore, should be reversed and

Plaintiffs1 causes of action for assault and battery should be
remanded for trial on the merits.
False Imprisonment
In dismissing the Plaintiffs1 fourth cause of action for false
imprisonment, the trial court again misstates the law and confuses a
number of legal issues.

The trial court asserted that:

Regardless of whether plaintiffs consented to the search. .
. plaintiffs voluntarily remained and submitted to the search.
Even if plaintiffs were afraid of losing their employment, they
submitted to the search without objecting or without attempting
to leave the premises.47
The trial court here claims to be ignoring the factual issue of
whether or not the plaintiffs consented to the search.

In reality,

however, the trial court finds reasonable implied consent in the
simple fact that the plaintiffs didn't object or attempt to leave.
In other words, despite claims to the contrary, the trial court here
rules as a matter of law that no reasonable jury would find that
plaintiffs did not consent—simply because they failed to get up and

47
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Record, p. 688.

try to walk out, or to jump up and object. As the Plaintiffs have
discussed previously, in their brief on appeal, when consent is not
express, but must be implied from the circumstances, whether consent
exists or not is an issue of fact, that must be decided by a jury.
The trial court erred when it ruled as a matter of law on this
disputed factual issue.
The trial court further ruled that dismissal of this cause of
action was also appropriate because again, Plaintiffs were not
confined, nor where they physically restrained.

Defendants in their

brief on appeal cite the case of Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement
Co., 91 P.2d 507, (Utah 1939) and assert that this case is not on
point because Hepworth was arrested.

This assertion is mistaken.

Hepworth was not arrested, but rather the dance hall security
officers, wearing their regular police uniforms, but acting in a nonpolice capacity, asked Hepworth to accompany them, and implicitly
threatened him with arrest if he did not.48

Based on their uniforms,

Hepworth believed them to have the power to arrest him, and therefore
felt compelled to comply with their 'request.1

In the present case,

Defendant Esquivel had the power to immediately terminate the
employment of anyone who objected to the search.

Esquivel himself

had indicated that while he knew his actions were illegal, he didn't
care.

Esquivel also indicated that it would be presumed that any

employee who objected was the thief.

The Utah Supreme Court stated,

in Hepworth:

48

Hepworth v. Covy Bros. Amusement Co., 91 P.2d 507,
(Utah 1939).
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If the words or conduct are such as to induce a reasonable
apprehension of force, and the means of coercion are at hand, a
person may be as effectually restrained and deprived of liberty
as by prison bars.49
The Utah Supreme Court did not determine in Hepworth whether the
force need be physical.

In the present case, the force was economic-

-plaintiffs and their co-workers reasonably assumed that anyone who
objected or attempted to leave would lose their job.

But the fact

that the force was economic does not make the force Esquivel used in
this case any less real than if he had held a gun to the Plaintiffs'
heads.

Esquivelfs means of coercion were readily at hand—he only

had to say, "you're fired."

Again, the reasonable inferences from

the undisputed facts, drawn in favor of the Plaintiffs, support
reversing and remanding this cause of action for trial on the merits.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In dismissing the Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, the trial
court held as a matter of law that none of the conduct alleged and
testified to, both in deposition and in affidavit form, was
sufficiently offensive to give rise to a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In other words, on the

uncontested facts of this case—the search, the hands running under
Ms. Mazariego's blouse and around her midriff, the pencil picking
through her hair—the trial court believed that it would be legally
impossible for a jury to find that this was outrageous conduct
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

Id., at 509.
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It is the plaintiffs' position

that the trial court erred, and that this cause of action, like the
others, should be remanded for trial on the merits.
Negligent (or Reckless) Infliction of Emotional Distress
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' sixth cause of action, for
reckless or negligent infliction of emotional distress on the grounds
that there
was no evidence that the search was conducted in a manner
which would involve an unreasonable risk of causing emotional
distress or than any emotional distress might result in illness
or bodily harm. Accordingly, the Court does not find any reason
why defendants should have realized that such results might
occur.50
Defendants support the trial court!s dismissal of this cause of
action with extensive reference to the alleged contradictions between
Plaintiffs1 deposition testimony and affidavit testimony.

As

discussed previously, these issues are not properly before this
court.

The evidence properly before the court supports the following

factual findings and reasonable inferences therefrom:
1) Defendant Esquivel knew the search was illegal.51
2) Defendant Esquivel ordered forty factory employees to submit
to a physical search of their persons and property anyway.52
3) It can be reasonably inferred that Defendant Esquivel knew
that the search would be offensive and humilliating to the
plaintiffs.
4) It can further be reasonably inferred that Defendant
Esquivel acted either intentionally to cause this humilliation
and offense, or in reckless disregard for the fact that such
offense and humilliation would result from the search.
5) The affidavit testimony of the plaintiffs and their
immediate family members testifies to the humilliation,

Record, p. 687.
Record, pp. 452, 439-438.
Id., see also, Record pp. 449-442.
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emotional, and in the case of Ms. Mazariegos, physical suffering
this incident caused in their lives.53
6) The affidavit testimony of Ms. Mazariegos and her sisters
shows that her intense nervous condition, complete with such
physical manifestations as a bloody discharge, were directly
caused by the unlawful search and other tortious conduct of Mr.
Esquivel .54
Because the undisputed facts and reasonable inferences from the
undisputed facts meet the necessary elements to establish a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the part of
Ms. Mazariegos, this cause of action should also be reversed and
remanded for trial on the merits.
Invasion of Privacy: Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Plaintiffs' seventh, eighth and ninth causes of action are for
invasion of privacy.

The trial court dismissed these causes of

action on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims of a physical search of
their persons and personal property in the workplace, and intrusive
questioning into highly personal affairs in an employment interview,
did not constitute any invasion of plaintiffs private space. As
Plaintiffs pointed out in their brief on appeal, the trial courts'
holding effectively rules that no Utah employee has any reasonable
expectation of any privacy, whatsoever, in their workplace.

This is

the case because on the facts of this case, the Defendants have
intruded into about every private space of an employee, short of a
strip search or direct questioning about their personal sex lives.
Defendants have personally searched plaintiffs' purses, wallets, and
lunch bags.

22

Defendants have searched plaintiffs pockets, shoes,

53

Record, pp. 452-426.

54

Record, pp. 449-446, 436-432.

socks, bras, and hair.

Defendants have asked about plaintiffs1

worthiness to enter an LDS temple.55
Employees are not property of their employer.

Their personal

affairs and personal property are their own, whether they are at home
or on the job.

While desks or lockers or other property of an

employer might merely be loaned to an employee, their purses, wallets
and pockets are still their own personal property, and plaintiff
employees, like all other Utah employees, have a right to the privacy
of that property.

Plaintiffs have established the necessary prima

facie case for an invasion of their privacy by intrusion upon
seclusion.

Despite the trial courts' assertions, and the Defendants'

claims, intrusion upon seclusion is not limited to intrusion into
one f s car or home.

The search of a purse or wallet is a commonly

used illustrative example of this type of invasion of privacy.56
The requirements of a prima facie case are specific:
1) an intrusion by the defendant(s)
2) into a matter which the plaintiff has a right to keep
private.
3) by the use of a method which is objectionable to the
reasonable person.57
Plaintiffs' allegations, testimony, and the uncontested facts of this
case are sufficient to establish this prima facie case in each of the
three claims for intrusion upon seclusion which the Plaintiffs have
raised.

A physical search of one's person, pockets, purse, wallet or

lunch bag constitutes a physical intrusion.

Plaintiffs, even in

Record, pp. 454-438.
See, e.g., Privacy, 62A Am Jur 2d § 60, p. 683.
Id., § 48, p. 673.
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their capacity as employees of the Defendants, have a right to keep
the contents of this extremely personal property private. A physical
search of their personal property is generally illegal, without a
warrant and probably cause.

Thus, presumably such a search would be

objectionable to a reasonable person.
Equally, highly personal questions regarding one's religious
affiliation and moral standing as determined by that religion, are
intrusive.

That religious affiliation and moral standing are also

within a zone of personal affairs that plaintiff rightfully may
expect to keep private.

Requiring such questions to be answered in

an employment interview would be offensive to a reasonable person.
Because Plaintiffs' allegations meet the required prima facie
case, these three causes of action for invasion of privacy should
also be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Defendants claims that plaintiffs' affidavit testimony
contradicts their deposition testimony are not properly addressed to
this court because the trial court refused to rule on this issue, and
Plaintiffs' deposition testimony was not properly entered on the
record before the trial court, and therefore was not properly
considered in determining defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Because this is the case, this Court also is unable to consider that
deposition testimony in ruling on the merits of this matter.
The question of precisely who was the responsible legal entity—
whether it was Jeanette Lynton in her individual capacity, or
Jeanette Lynton in her corporate capacity—is a materially disputed
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issue of fact, and therefore the trial courts' ruling as a matter of
law the Defendant Lynton was not liable was inappropriate and should
be reversed, and this issue remanded for trial on the merits.
The trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs had failed to
state a cause of action on any of their nine claims because they had
failed to establish actual damages.

The proof required by the trial

court is not applicable to cases of dignitary torts. Because the
trial court applied the incorrect legal rule in this matter, the
courts' ruling on this issue was in error, and should be reversed,
and this matter remanded for trial on the merits.
Finally, plaintiffs' affidavits and other testimony clearly
establish the necessary elements of the prima facie cases required
for each of their nine causes of action.

Therefore, the trial

court's Order dismissing all nine causes of action should be reversed
and remanded for trial on the merits.
Because the trial court erred in its rulings on each of these
matters, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to reverse the
trial courts' orders granting the Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment, and remand this entire matter for trial on the merits of
Plaintiffs' claims.
DATED this

day of April, 1996.

MARTI L. JONES
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/
APPELLANTS

25

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Reply Brief to Counsel for Defendants/Appellees,
Lorin D. Martin, first class postage prepaid, to the following
address:
Loren D. Martin
P.O. Box 11950
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0590
this 8th day of April, 1996.

26

